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INTRODUCTION
How should a court handle a liability insurance policy sold to a tavern that
purports to cover general commercial liability, yet contains an exclusion for
liability “arising out of or in connection with the manufacturing, selling,
distributing, serving or furnishing of any alcoholic beverages”?1 How about a
† Executive Editor, Volume 166, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 2018,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2012, Bard College. My deepest gratitude to Executive
Editor Alyssa Lattner, Comments Editor Max Linder, and all of this Comment's other editors for their
meticulous work and helpful input. I am also tremendously grateful to Professor Tom Baker for
inspiring my enthusiasm for insurance law, and for so graciously showing me the ropes in the field.
1 Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 695 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
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liability insurance policy sold to DISH Network that contains an exclusion
for liability “arising out of the ownership, operation or use of any satellite”?2
Or how about one that purports to cover a business for its liability arising out
of “discrimination,” yet contains exclusions for discrimination that either
violates a statute, is done knowingly or intentionally, is directed towards
prospective, current, or wrongfully terminated employees, or is “committed
on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, age or national origin”?3
In all three of those cases, the policyholders argued that it would be unfair
for the court to enforce the exclusions4 in their policies as they were written.
Those exclusions, the policyholders argued, wiped out so much of the
coverage that otherwise would have existed under the policies’ insuring
clauses5 that the coverage would be practically worthless.6 Thus, the courts
were asked to analyze those policies under the doctrine known as the Illusory
Coverage Doctrine (ICD). The ICD is implicated when an insurance policy
is written in such a way that could give the policyholder the “illusion” that
the policy covers risks that are not actually covered. The ICD is somewhat
obscure, and no precise formulation of the doctrine has yet achieved
predominance among American jurisdictions.
This Comment will discuss the status of the ICD in American insurance law,
especially liability insurance law, and will also offer my own views as to how the
doctrine can be best understood and refined. I will first argue that, while some
courts have conceived of the issue of illusory coverage as an interpretive one
related to contra proferentum, or as matter of “public policy,” the ICD is best
understood instead as a doctrine of enforceability whose function is to protect
policyholders from procedurally unconscionable insurance policies.7
I will then address the questions of what standards are and ought to be
used to determine whether an insurance policy “triggers” the ICD. In other
2 Dish Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1153-54 (D. Colo. 2013),
aff ’d sub nom. Dish Network Corp. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 772 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 2014).
3 Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
4 “An ‘exclusion’ is a term in an insurance policy that identifies a category of claims that is not
covered by the policy.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 32 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed
Final Draft 2017).
5 “An ‘insuring clause’ is a term in a liability insurance policy that grants insurance coverage.”
Id. § 31. I will occasionally use the term “coverage provision” to refer to the same thing.
6 In Mike’s Speedway, the court agreed with the policyholder that the “absolute liquor” exclusion
rendered the tavern’s general commercial liability insurance illusory. 949 F. Supp. at 702. Likewise,
the court in DISH Network found that the “Satellite Exclusion” rendered DISH Network’s coverage
illusory, and thus that the exclusion was unenforceable. 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54. In Jostens, the court
did not disagree with the policyholder that its policy’s exclusions “effectively swallow the general
grant of discrimination coverage,” but found that those exclusions were nonetheless enforceable
because the policy still provided real coverage for other kinds of liability. 527 N.W.2d at 118-19.
7 Throughout this Comment, I will use the term “policyholders” to refer to all insureds—people who
are insured by an insurance policy. This is simply so that the reader does not mix up “insurers” and “insureds.”
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words, how can we tell if an insurance policy features illusory coverage? My
discussion of this issue will rely on a metaphor of shadows cast by exclusions
upon the coverage that would otherwise exist. The shadow metaphor allows
us to clearly visualize two distinct factors that could determine whether the
ICD is triggered. The first, which I will call “scope,” corresponds to the size
of the shadow: over how much insurance coverage must the exclusion’s shadow
extend before the ICD is triggered? The second, which I will call “degree,”
corresponds to the darkness of the shadow: does the coverage that falls beneath
the exclusion’s shadow disappear completely, or is there still some possibility
that the policyholder will be able to use that coverage?
To clarify, consider a simple hypothetical liability insurance policy sold to
the owner of private campgrounds. The policy has two insuring clauses: a
Weather Clause granting coverage for weather-related injuries; and a Wildlife
Clause granting coverage for wildlife-related injuries. Suppose further that the
policy has a Lightning Exclusion removing coverage for injuries caused by
lightning. The “scope” of the Lightning Exclusion would extend only to the
coverage granted by the Weather Clause, not the Wildlife Clause. The “degree”
to which the exclusion would eliminate the Weather Clause’s coverage would be
rather low, since lightning comprises only a small proportion of weather-related
risks. Thus, we should envision the Lightning Exclusion casting a faint shadow
upon the coverage granted by the Weather Clause.
Now suppose instead that the policy had a Serious Injury Exclusion, removing
coverage for injuries from which the victim does not recover within twenty days.
The scope of this exclusion would extend to the coverage granted by the Weather
Clause and the Wildlife clause, since victims of both weather- and wildlife-related
injuries can take longer than twenty days to recover. The degree to which the
exclusion would eliminate coverage would be relatively high, since most injuries
that generate lawsuits are too serious to recover from within twenty days. Thus, the
Serious Injury Exclusion would cast a dark shadow over the coverage granted by
both of the policy’s insuring clauses.
With respect to scope, I will conclude that no scope should be construed as
being so narrow as to preclude the ICD from being triggered. In other words, as
long as the shadow cast by an exclusion is dark enough, the ICD should be
triggered no matter how narrow the shadow is. Once the court finds any coverage
shrouded in a shadow dark enough to trigger the ICD, the court should not
proceed to consider how much other coverage is left beyond the shadow’s reach.
With respect to degree, I will conclude that an exclusion should not need
to completely eliminate the possibility that a policyholder could benefit from
the overshadowed coverage in order to trigger the ICD. Instead, the ICD
should be triggered if the coverage that remains available “is extremely
minimal and affords no realistic protection” even if “there might be some
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small circumstance where coverage could arguably exist.”8 In other words, the
shadow must be very dark, but not necessarily pitch black.
Returning to our campgrounds hypothetical, on my view, the coverage
granted by the policy’s Wildlife Clause could be rendered illusory by a
Terrestrial Animal Exclusion that removes coverage for injuries related to
animals that live on land. If virtually all of the dangerous wildlife around the
campgrounds are terrestrial animals—bees, bears, and so on—such an
exclusion could make the coverage for wildlife-related injuries effectively
useless to the policyholder. If the exclusion limits the Wildlife Clause’s
coverage to only the most far-fetched of scenarios—like an aquatic crab
somehow taking a camper’s eye out—it makes the coverage illusory.
Once the ICD is triggered—that is, once the court has found a policy to
contain illusory coverage—the next question is what the court should do
about it. I will conclude that the right remedy for illusory coverage is to
reform the offending exclusions—and only the offending exclusions—to
conform to the policyholder’s reasonable expectations regarding their
coverage. Thus, if an insurer denies coverage on the sole basis of an exclusion
or set of exclusions that render the coverage illusory, the court should require
the insurer to provide coverage if and only if the policyholder had a
reasonable expectation that the policy made such coverage available.
After explaining how the ICD works, I will discuss its relationship to the
other doctrines that could be implicated by similar fact patterns—namely,
contra proferentum and the doctrine of reasonable expectations—and explain
why the ICD strikes a better balance than those alternative doctrines between
the legitimate interests of policyholders and insurers.
I. WHAT THE DOCTRINE IS AND WHY IT EXISTS
A. Enforceability, not Interpretation
Several courts have incorporated the principle that insurance policies
should not contain illusory coverage into their interpretations of policies’ terms.
The Superior Court of Delaware did this in a case in which the manufacturer
of respiratory equipment sought coverage for its liability arising out of injuries
that miners suffered when the equipment allegedly failed, causing the miners
to inhale coal dust.9 One of the general liability policies under which the
manufacturer sought coverage contained an exclusion barring coverage for
injuries arising out of the “‘emission, discharge, seepage, release [or] escape’
8
9

Martinez v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho 2000).
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., No. CV N10C-07-241 MMJ, 2016 WL 498848,
at *3-4 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2016).
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of any ‘pollutant.’”10 The issue, therefore, was whether the coal dust floating
around in coal mines as a result of the mining was a “pollutant.”11 The court
compared the coal dust to “radiation used in medical x-rays” and “chlorine
bleach used for cleaning” and concluded that such coal dust was not a pollutant
because it was “in a place where [it] was reasonably expected to be” and the
miners’ exposure to it “was a necessary part of the job.”12
However, perhaps sensing that such reasoning was vulnerable to criticism,
the court added the following:
Any other interpretation would render the coverage illusory. To permit the
Insurers to deny coverage under these circumstances would mean that there
could never be coverage for any alleged failure or defect in the respiratory
safety equipment manufactured by [the policyholder]. The Insurers could not
have been surprised by the fact that the [policyholder], Mine Safety
Appliances Company, manufactured safety appliances.”13

Mine Safety seemed to treat the fact that a certain interpretation of an
exclusion’s language would render coverage illusory as a reason to reject that
interpretation. There is nothing wrong with such an approach. Indeed, to the
extent that contract interpretation is about ascertaining the nature of the
bargain the parties intended to make,14 it makes sense to be somewhat
suspicious of an illusory coverage–creating interpretation of an exclusion. This
is especially so where, as in Mine Safety, such an interpretation would defeat a
major purpose for purchasing the policy. Just as constitutional interpretation
may presume that the founders did not intend to enact a suicide pact, the
interpretation of liability insurance policies may, at least to some extent,
presume that policyholders do not intend to throw their money down the drain
on useless insurance policies and leave themselves exposed to risks that they
cannot afford to bear (and that state insurance regulators do not intend to
allow such ineffective and overpriced policies to remain on the market).
Note, however, that there is a difference between, on the one hand,
disfavoring interpretations of ambiguous exclusions that would render
coverage illusory, and, on the other hand, refusing to enforce unambiguous
exclusions as they are written on the grounds that they would render coverage
10 Id. at *3.
11 Id.
12 Id. at *3-4.
13 Id. at *4 (footnote omitted).
14 See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A
CONTRACTS § 32:2 (4th ed. 1993) (“Consistent with the notion

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
that a contract represents the
parties’ private agreement as to their legal relationship, liabilities and rights, the primary purpose
and function of the court in interpreting a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’
intention.”) (footnotes omitted).
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illusory. In some cases, courts have said they were doing the former, when
they were actually doing the latter.15
The Supreme Court of Indiana did this in American States Insurance Co. v.
Kiger, in which the owner of a Sunoco station sought coverage for his liability
arising out of the leakage of gasoline from one of the station’s underground
tanks.16 The owner had a comprehensive liability insurance policy—described
by the court as a “garage policy”17—which contained an exclusion for liability
“arising out of the . . . escape of ‘pollutants.’”18 The policy further stated that
“Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant,
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.”19
As a matter of interpretation, the gasoline obviously was a “chemical” and
its leakage into the ground obviously constituted the “escape” of a “pollutant.”
Yet, the court presented a rather strained argument to the contrary.20 The court
began by stating that the policy’s definition of “pollutants” “[c]learly . . . cannot
be read literally as it would negate virtually all coverage. For example, if a visitor
slips on a grease spill then, since grease is a ‘chemical,’ there would be no
insurance coverage. Accordingly, this clause requires interpretation.”21 While it
may be true that the exclusion would require interpretation as applied to a
grease spill, that does not mean it requires interpretation as applied to the
leakage of large amounts of gasoline into the ground, which is exactly the kind
of occurrence that the pollution exclusion’s language calls to mind.
Yet, the court proceeded to declare that since “the term ‘pollutant’ does
not obviously include gasoline and, accordingly, is ambiguous, we . . . must
construe the language against the insurer who drafted it.”22 It held that the
“rule of construing exclusions strictly against the insurer and in favor of
coverage . . . requires that coverage for the gasoline contamination which
occurred be available” under the policy.23
15 See, e.g., St. Mary’s Area Water Auth. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d
397, 411 (M.D. Pa. 2006), order vacated on reconsideration sub nom. St. Mary’s Area Water Auth. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 630 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (“The rationale [for applying the
ICD] often is that the conflict between the coverage language and the exclusion language creates an
ambiguity that must be resolved in favor of the insured.”); Isdoll v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 466 S.E.2d
48, 50 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (reasoning that there was a “genuine ambiguity” in a policy because it’s
express coverage for assault was rendered illusory by a provision that limited coverage to the
performance of law enforcement duties, since “[i]t could always be argued that assault . . . do[es] not
arise out of the performance of one’s duties”).
16 662 N.E.2d 945, 946-47 (Ind. 1996).
17 Id. at 948-49.
18 Id. at 948.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 948-49.
21 Id. at 948.
22 Id. at 949.
23 Id.
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Notwithstanding the court’s strained interpretative analysis, it is clear
from other lines in the opinion, which the court presented as if they were
dicta, that the real reason behind the court’s holding was that it would be
terribly unfair to the owner of a gasoline station if his liability insurance
policy—a “garage policy,” which people generally expect to be well suited to
such businesses’ needs—turned out not to cover liability related to gasoline
leaks. “[T]hat an insurance company would sell a ‘garage policy’ to a gas
station when that policy specifically excluded the major source of potential
liability,” the court stated, “is, to say the least, strange.”24 The court later noted
that it was “particularly troubled” by the interpretation of the policy that
would mean that the policyholder “was sold a policy that provided no
coverage for a large segment of the gas station’s business operations.”25 Giving
the game away even more clearly, the court declared that “[i]f a garage policy
is intended to exclude coverage for damage caused by the leakage of gasoline,
the language of the contract must be explicit.”26
As far as contract interpretation is concerned, it should make no difference
whether this exclusion for gasoline leaks was explicitly declared or, as was the
case, unambiguously implied by the broader pollution exclusion. Rather, the
difference between stating something explicitly and implying something
unambiguously is relevant only to the question of procedural
unconscionability. Thus, it is apparent that the court’s holding was not really
based on the contra proferentum cannon. Instead, its holding reflected a refusal
to enforce the exclusion as it was written because the exclusion would render
coverage that the policyholder reasonably expected to exist illusory.
Courts should distinguish between the task of interpreting policies’
ambiguous exclusions and the task of determining whether or not an
unambiguous exclusion should be enforced as written.27 It is in the
enforceability context, not the interpretation context, that the ICD stands as
its own doctrine. Several courts have expressly recognized the ICD as a basis
upon which to grant coverage that would be barred under an exclusion if it
were enforced as written.28 That is how courts should explain their holdings
24
25
26
27

Id. at 948.
Id. at 949.
Id.
For a good example of this distinction being drawn, see Danis v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 823
N.E.2d 59, 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), in which the court stated “while the [policyholders] claim that
the provision is ambiguous, what they really mean is that if the pollution exclusion is enforced as it
reads, the policy will be rendered illusory.”
28 See, e.g., Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Sunset Strip, Inc., No. 1:14-01273, 2015 WL 4545876, at *6 (S.D.
Ind. July 28, 2015) (“If the policy is illusory, a court will not enforce the policy as written; instead,
the court must enforce the policy ‘to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the insured.’”) (citations
omitted); Great N. Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *4 (W.D. Pa.
May 12, 2008) (interpreting Pennsylvania law to hold that “if an exclusion provision would
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in cases like Kiger, where they effectively reform unambiguous language to
protect policyholders from the unfairness of illusory coverage.
B. Procedural Unconscionability, not Public Policy
Having established that the ICD is a doctrine of enforceability rather than
interpretation, the next issue to discuss is what justifies the doctrine’s use. Some
courts have dubiously characterized illusory coverage as a violation of public
policy.29 Usually, however, the only “public policy” that can appropriately serve
to invalidate the terms of an insurance contract is that which derives from federal
or state constitutions, legislation, or the common law.30 Thus, for instance, an
exclusion in an auto liability insurance policy that renders statutorily mandated
coverage illusory may violate public policy. Such an exclusion would bring about
a situation that the statute was enacted to prevent—namely, one in which victims
of car accidents can have difficulty collecting compensation from negligent,

effectively preclude coverage for all risks reasonably anticipated by the parties under a particular
coverage provision (i.e., an illusory coverage provision), the coverage provision should be enforced
in a way that would protect the reasonable expectations of the insured”); Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield
Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“The illusory coverage doctrine . . . operates
to qualify the general rule that courts will enforce an insurance contract as written.”); Gillund v.
Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 778 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“Where coverage is illusory,
we have concluded that the contract should be reformed so that it comports with the insured’s
reasonable expectations.”).
29 See, e.g., Pompa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 1139, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that
“exclusions that render coverage illusory . . . . violate public policy” in Colorado) (citations omitted);
Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 699 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(“Indiana courts have . . . held that insurance policies providing illusory coverage violate public
policy.”); Roylance v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., No. CV 2006 9218, 2008 WL 4202018, at *2 (Idaho
Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2008) (“When a policy provides only an illusion of coverage for its premiums, the
policy will be considered void for violating public policy.”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh
v. Glenview Park Dist., 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1046 (Ill. 1994) (Bilandic, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
because an “exclusion deceptively affects the general liability risks that the endorsement purports to
assume, the . . . exclusion violates public policy and should not be enforced”).
30 One prominent insurance law treatise states that public policy comes only from “legislation
(state and federal statutes) and constitutions,” “administrative regulations especially including the
regulations promulgated by state departments of insurance,” and “judicial opinions enforcing the
statutes and regulations and their public policy foundation though judicial construction of the
statutes and regulations.” 15-114 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE ARCHIVE § 114.2
(2d ed. 2011); see also Zeigler v. Ill. Tr. & Sav. Bank, 91 N.E. 1041, 1045-46 (Ill. 1910) (“The public
policy of the state . . . is to be found in its Constitution and its statutes, and, when cases arise
concerning matters upon which they are silent, then in its judicial decisions . . . . Courts will not
look to other sources to determine the public policy of a state.”); Heller v. Pa. League of Cities &
Municipalities, 32 A.3d 1213, 1220 (Pa. 2011) (“Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the
laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest.” (quoting
Burstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa. 2002)); State Farm Gen. Ins.
Co. v. Emerson, 687 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Wash. 1984) (“[W]e have been hesitant to invoke public policy
to limit or avoid express contract terms absent legislative action.” (citations omitted)).
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judgment-proof drivers.31 In fact, many courts have refused to enforce exclusions
in auto liability insurance policies merely because they “narrow[] or restrict[]
statutorily-mandated coverage.”32
But no court has suggested that the ICD only applies to policies whose
exclusions eviscerate the kind of coverage that is mandatory under legislation or
the common law. In fact, such a limitation would mean that the ICD is completely
swallowed by the broader public policy rule against exclusions that merely narrow
or restrict such mandatory coverage.33 Thus, the only way to justify the ICD as a
matter of public policy would be to point to statutes that specifically seek to
prohibit policies that contain illusory coverage (which, if they exist at all, are not
common) or to argue that the rule against illusory coverage is clearly enshrined in
the common law (which, at least as of now, would be hard to do).
Another problem with rooting the ICD in public policy is that courts tend to
conceive of the doctrine as a means of protecting policyholders from getting
ripped off by their insurers, rather than protecting third parties from insurance
policies’ negative externalities.34 As Judge Richard Posner has explained, “The
basic difference is that between a contract in which the parties combine to harm
31 A situation similar to this arose in Martinez v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d
902 (Idaho 2000). There, the Supreme Court of Idaho found that an exclusion that rendered
underinsured motorist coverage illusory also violated public policy because it deprived the policyholder
of coverage that, pursuant to a state statute, could only be excluded from an auto insurance policy if the
policyholder affirmatively rejects it in writing. Id. at 906-08. The court found that the underinsured
motorist coverage must be available to the policyholder notwithstanding the exclusion, both because
holding the policy void would defeat the purpose of the statute and because the insurer “is estopped
from denying coverage because of the illusion of coverage it has created.” Id. at 908.
32 Marcus v. Hanover Ins. Co., 740 So. 2d 603, 606 (La. 1999) (citing Block v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
433 So. 2d 1040, 1044 (La. 1983)). Marcus held a “business use exclusion” in an auto liability insurance
policy to be unenforceable because it undermined a statutory scheme that was “intended to attach
financial protection to the vehicle regardless of the purpose for which the vehicle is being operated.”
Id. at 608. Most jurisdictions have also held that auto liability insurance policies’ “family member
exclusions”—which remove coverage for claims that arise when policyholders injure their own family
members—are also unenforceable because they contravene the purpose of statutes that make auto
insurance mandatory. See Nat’l Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 879 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1993) (“The
majority of jurisdictions with mandatory insurance laws hold family member exclusions invalid because
they are contrary to public policy.”) (citing several cases); see also 15-114 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE
LAW & PRACTICE ARCHIVE § 114.2 (2d ed. 2011) (“An insurance contract term is not void as against
public policy simply because the term narrows circumstances under which the insurance coverage
applies, but only if the term directly limits statutorily mandated benefits.” (emphasis added)).
33 See supra note 29 for cases applying this broader public policy rule.
34 See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 951 F.2d 787, 790 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining
that illusory coverage contracts, while they may not violate public policy, can be exploitative of a
party); Buck v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 921 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (characterizing
an interpretation of a policy that would create illusory coverage as one that would “take away on the
one hand what it purports to offer with the other”); Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 647 N.W.2d
223, 227, 238 (Wis. 2002) (affirming a lower court’s finding that an insurance policy was “illusory
and therefore unenforceable” in part because the policies’ language sent “several false signals” and
violated “the insured’s reasonable expectation of coverage”).
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others . . . and a contract in which one party exploits the other. The former is the
domain of the public policy defense, the latter of fraud, incapacity, and related
defenses.”35 Accordingly, Judge Posner concluded that “[c]ontracts that are
‘illusory’ in the sense of hopelessly or deceptively one-sided fail, if at all, on . . .
grounds[] such as fraud, unconscionability, or undue influence.”36
Of course, third parties may be harmed by the sale of insurance policies,
especially liability insurance policies, that contain illusory coverage. Most
obviously, if an exclusion renders certain coverage illusory, thus eliminating
the insurer’s obligation to indemnify its policyholders for certain third-party
tort claims, the injured victims who bring those claims may be unable to
collect compensation for their injuries. However, the same could be said of
all exclusions, whether they render coverage illusory or not, since exclusions,
by definition, reduce the amount of coverage available under a policy.37 Thus,
courts must maintain that, while exclusions in liability insurance policies
make it more difficult for injured tort victims to receive compensation, they
are not ipso facto contrary to public policy.38
Since the most salient purpose of the ICD is to protect policyholders who
unwittingly purchase insurance policies that provide much less coverage than
they expected, the ICD is more related to procedural unconscionability39 and
the doctrine of reasonable expectations than it is to public policy. The
principle that came to be known as the doctrine of reasonable expectations
was articulated by Professor Robert E. Keeton in a 1970 article as follows:
“The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations.”40 Since it relies on a distinction between features of insurance
policies that are readily apparent to the policyholder and those that would go
35
36
37

See Ashland Oil, 951 F.2d at 790.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 32(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017).
38 See Kelly v. Figueiredo, 610 A.2d 1296, 1299-1301 (Conn. 1992) (rejecting the argument that an
exclusion in a liability insurance policy violated “the public policy goal of assuring that the innocent
victims of injuries caused by intoxicated persons be able to recover compensation for those injuries”
because they found no such public policy embodied in a statute (internal quotation marks omitted));
Mendoza v. Rivera-Chavez, 999 P.2d 29, 36 (Wash. 2000) (stating in an analysis of the enforceability
of a liability insurance policy’s exclusion that “[i]t is well established that insurance companies may
limit their liability unless the limitation is contrary to public policy” (citation omitted)).
39 “Procedural unconscionability” refers to unfairness in the formation process that deprives a
party of a “meaningful choice about whether and how to enter into the transaction” by, for example,
burying terms in “fine print or legal ‘gobbledygook.’” 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 1993).
40 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV.
961, 967 (1970).
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unnoticed without “painstaking study” of the policy’s language, the doctrine
of reasonable expectations can be understood as a protection against certain
procedurally unconscionable terms. As discussed in Part III, the ICD can
provide narrower and more predictable rules for determining whether an
exclusion is so procedurally unconscionable as to render it unenforceable.
II. HOW THE DOCTRINE WORKS
This Part will discuss some variations in how different courts have
formulated and applied the ICD, and will offer my own views on which
versions should prevail. Sections A and B will discuss the scope and degree,
respectively, of an exclusion’s impact on coverage that is necessary in order to
find that the exclusion renders coverage illusory, thus “triggering” the ICD.
Section C will discuss what the courts should do to protect policyholders after
they have found that a policy contains illusory coverage.
A. Scope in the Trigger Test: How Big Must the Shadow Be?
The best position on the scope issue was displayed by a district court
interpreting Pennsylvania law in Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Greenwich
Insurance Co.41 Great Northern involved a policy with an insuring clause
purporting to offer coverage for several kinds of losses, including “property
damage . . . arising out of blowout or cratering.”42 “[B]lowout” and “cratering”
were both defined in the policy.43 “[B]lowout” was defined as “an uncontrollable
flow of gas, oil, drilling mud, water, well fluids, well materials, or a combination
of any of them, from the wellhead or borehole, into the atmosphere, surface
land or surface water or subterranean strata.”44 After the policyholder suffered
property damage from a blowout, it sought coverage under the policy.45 The
insurer attempted to deny coverage under the policy’s “Pollution Exclusion,”
which provided that “[t]his insurance does not apply [to] property damage
[caused by] alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration,
release or escape of pollutants at any time.”46 The policy defined “pollutants”
as “any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acid, alkalis, chemicals and waste.”47
41
42
43
44
45
46

No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. Technically, the insurer did not try to completely “deny” coverage, but rather tried to use
the exclusion to reduce the coverage’s limit from $1,000,000 to $100,000. Id. at *2. For these purposes,
however, this would be the same as denying coverage.
47 Id. at *2.
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The policyholder argued that the pollution exclusion rendered the policy’s
coverage of blowouts illusory, since a “blowout, by definition, is a pollution
event.”48 The insurer responded by pointing out that, even if the pollution
exclusion eviscerated coverage for blowouts, it left coverage for cratering intact.49
The court held that “[t]he question [of whether the ICD is triggered] is
whether a particular coverage provision is swallowed-up by an exclusion, not
whether the policy as a whole provides some degree of coverage despite the
existence of an exclusion.”50 Under this formulation, the exclusion in question
does not need to cast a shadow over all of a policy’s coverage in order to
trigger the ICD, but rather only over any single “coverage provision.” The
court went on to clarify that a “coverage provision” is any single kind of risk
that an insuring clause describes as being covered:
The policy language separates the words “blowout” and “cratering” with the
disjunctive “or,” thereby providing coverage for two alternative risks.
Greenwich’s insured payed a premium surcharge . . . for blowout or cratering
coverage, and Greenwich cannot reasonably argue that the [pollution
exclusion] does not render blowout coverage . . . illusory simply because the
[coverage] is nevertheless available to cover cratering.51

This tells us that the text purporting to cover “property damage . . . arising
out of blowout or cratering”52 is actually two coverage provisions: one covering
the risk of blowouts and another covering the risk of cratering.
Under the court’s approach, there is no unit of coverage within a policy
that is too small for the ICD to protect. If an exclusion casts a shadow on any
single risk that any insuring clause purports to cover, the ICD can be triggered
(as long as the shadow is dark enough). The court found that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the shadow cast by the pollution
exclusion upon the blowout coverage was dark enough to trigger the ICD.53
If the illusory coverage argument in Great Northern had been governed by
Minnesota law, however, it almost certainly would have been defeated at
summary judgment. This is because Minnesota’s courts have adopted the view
that the ICD should only be triggered if all of the coverage to which a portion of the
premium was specifically allocated is rendered illusory.54 Under the Minnesota rule,
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at *6.
Id. at *5.
Id. (emphases added).
Id. at *5 n.3.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *7.
See Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“We
believe that the doctrine of illusory coverage is best applied . . . where part of the premium is
specifically allocated to a particular type or period of coverage and that coverage turns out to be
functionally nonexistent.”); accord United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fid. Title Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 714, 719
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even if the pollution exclusion in Great Northern had completely eliminated
coverage for blowouts, the ICD would not have been triggered so long as it left
the coverage for cratering intact, since the policyholder only paid one surcharge
that was allocated to both blowout coverage and cratering coverage.55 Thus, under
that rule, the ICD would have only been triggered if there was a surcharge
allocated exclusively to the blowout coverage.
An argument in favor of an approach like Minnesota’s—in which a shadow
cast upon some coverage can fail to trigger the ICD because there is enough
other coverage outside the shadow’s reach—was offered by a district court
interpreting Indiana law in Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Sunset Strip, Inc.56 The
court criticized the Great Northern approach—in which a shadow cast upon
some coverage can trigger the ICD irrespective of how much other coverage
remains outside the shadow’s reach—on grounds that it
proves too much, as accepting this argument would allow any insured who has
been denied coverage to prevail on an illusory coverage claim by drawing
arbitrary lines in the insured’s policy. The insured, that is, could always argue
that the relevant claims in the underlying case only pertain to a specific
coverage provision, such that the Court should only analyze whether that
specific provision is illusory and ignore any analysis pertaining to other
provisions. By hypothesis, however, the insurer would have already determined
that the claim at issue was not covered by the specific provision, such that the
Court would necessarily conclude that coverage would not exist. This would
automatically render that provision illusory, and . . . would thus effectively
allow any insured to negate the effect of any coverage exclusion simply by
ignoring the context of that exclusion in the insurance policy as a whole.57

This argument overlooks the difference between two separate issues:
(1) whether coverage for the specific occurrence that happened is barred by
an exclusion; and (2) whether so many other occurrences, with different
characteristics than the one that actually happened, would also be barred that
the coverage must be rendered illusory. Just because the shadow cast upon a
particular coverage provision is dark enough to eliminate coverage for the

(8th Cir. 2001); see also Great W. Cas. Co. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 734 F. Supp. 2d 718, 738-39 (D.
Minn. 2010) (finding the ICD to not be triggered because there was no specifically priced portion
of the policy that was useless to the policyholder); Kabanuk Diversified Invs., Inc. v. Credit Gen.
Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting a policyholder’s argument that it
deserved certain coverage under the ICD because “[n]o evidence was presented that any premium
was specifically allocated to [the] coverage” the policyholder sought).
55 Great N., 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 n.3.
56 No. 1:14-01273, 2015 WL 4545876, at *17 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2015).
57 Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
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actual occurrence that happened does not mean the shadow is dark enough to
render that provision’s coverage illusory.
In Great Northern, for instance, it was undisputed that the particular
blowout for which the policyholder sought coverage constituted pollution,
and thus would be barred from coverage if the pollution exclusion were
enforced as written.58 But that did not mean that the blowout coverage was
illusory. Rather, the policyholder had to show that almost all possible blowouts
that could occur would also constitute pollution and be barred from
coverage.59 Thus, it is not the case that, if the only coverage provisions that
are relevant to the ICD’s triggering test are those that fall under the
exclusion’s shadow, then a finding that coverage for a particular occurrence is
barred by an exclusion would automatically trigger the ICD.60
Moreover, the Nautilus court’s concern that policyholders could use the
ICD to gain undeserved coverage by “drawing arbitrary lines”61 in the policy
gets the problem backwards. The real problem of arbitrary line-drawing is the
one that exists under approaches like Minnesota’s, where the ICD’s triggering
test looks beyond the exclusion’s shadow to see how much other coverage
remains intact. If the test required that the shadow extend to all of the coverage
within a discretely priced piece of the policy—as Minnesota’s test does—then
an insurer could avoid triggering the ICD by manipulating where it places the
lines between those discretely priced pieces.
For example, suppose that the insurer from Great Northern had started out
with a policy that allocated, say, $1000 of the premium to blowout coverage and
another $1000 of the premium to cratering coverage. Now suppose that a court
found that the pollution exclusion rendered the blowout coverage, but not the
cratering coverage, illusory. If the Minnesota rule applied, the insurer would be
able to get around the ICD in the future by simply erasing the line between
blowout coverage and cratering coverage and allocating $2000 of the premium
to coverage for both blowouts and cratering. Why should that be? Is a person
who pays $1000 in exchange only for blowout coverage entitled to more
protection than a person who pays $2000 in exchange for both blowout coverage

58
59

Great N., 2008 WL 2048354, at *7.
The court ruled that the factual issue was whether non-pollution property damage resulting
from a blowout can fairly be said to constitute a “reasonably expected set of circumstances.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting St. Mary’s Water Auth. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 397, 412 (M.D. Pa. 2006)).
60 This can be seen even more clearly through the campgrounds hypothetical from the
Introduction. Obviously, a Lightning Exclusion would not render a Weather Clause’s grant of
coverage for weather-related injuries illusory, since such coverage would still be available for injuries
related to any other weather-related phenomenon besides lightning, such as extreme temperatures,
heavy precipitation, and violent winds.
61 No. 1:14-01273, 2015 WL 4545876, at *17 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2015).

2018]

The Illusory Coverage Doctrine: A Critical Review

1559

and $1000’s worth of cratering coverage? Surely not.62 Thus, tests that look
beyond the shadow to see how much other coverage remains beyond its scope
are the tests that allow arbitrary line-drawing to bring about unfair outcomes.
There is no good reason for the ICD’s trigger test to look beyond the
shadow to see how much coverage remains unaffected by the exclusion in
question. In other words, there should be no such thing as a shadow that is
“too small” to trigger the ICD.63 The ICD’s test should focus, then, not on
the scope of the exclusion’s effect on the policy’s coverage, but only on the
degree to which the exclusion reduces the possibility that a given piece of
coverage will actually come in handy to the policyholder.64
B. Degree in the Trigger Test: How Dark Must the Shadow Be?
The next issue in the ICD’s trigger test is the question of degree. How
dark of a shadow must an exclusion (or multiple exclusions65) cast upon
coverage in order to render the coverage illusory and trigger the ICD?
One conceivable answer is that the coverage is only illusory if it is
impossible for any occurrence to fall within the coverage without also falling
within the exclusion. The simplest way for this to happen would be for an
insuring clause to say “X” is covered and for an exclusion to say that “X” is
excluded from coverage. Yet, since the statement “X and not-X” is
62 See W. Reserve Mut. Cas. Co. v. Holland, 666 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (finding
the ICD to be triggered because an auto insurance policy’s underinsured motorist coverage was
illusory, even though the premium paid for that coverage also paid for non-illusory uninsured motorist
coverage, because “[a]n insurer cannot charge a premium for two conceptually distinct types of
coverage, at a presumably higher rate than would be charged for one type of coverage, if both types
of coverage do not actually exist”); see also Ile v. Foremost Ins. Co., 809 N.W.2d 617, 625-26 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Holland, 666 N.E. 2d at 969), rev’d sub nom. Ile ex rel. Estate of Ile v. Foremost
Ins. Co., 823 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. 2012).
63 This position may seem unfair to insurers, who may innocently add exclusions to their
insurance forms that incidentally happen to render coverage illusory for one little risk in one little
insuring clause. However, as discussed in Section II.C, the most appropriate safeguard for insurers’
interests in such situations is a rule whereby, once an exclusion is found to have triggered the ICD, it
should only be reformed to the extent that it is contrary to the policyholder’s reasonable expectations.
That way, the only (tiny) pieces of coverage that the ICD would protect against ICD-triggering
exclusions would be those that the policyholder reasonably expected to possess.
64 See TIG Ins. Co. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 2d 439, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (“The relevant
inquiry is ‘whether a particular coverage provision is swallowed-up by an exclusion, not whether the
policy as a whole provides some degree of coverage despite the existence of an exclusion.’” (quoting
Great N. Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co, No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2008))).
65 I add “or multiple exclusions” here to point out that it does not matter whether a policy
contains only one exclusion that casts a shadow of a certain darkness over a certain area of coverage,
or multiple exclusions that collectively cast a shadow of the same darkness over that same area. For
example, a group of twenty-six exclusions—one for “A,” one for “B,” and so on all the way through
“Z”—should be analyzed as if it were a single exclusion for “the letters A through Z.” See, e.g.,
Martinez v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 906-07 (Idaho 2000) (holding
that the cumulative effect of three different exclusions rendered coverage illusory).
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ambiguous66—does it mean X, not-X, or something else?—it seems that contra
proferentum could be employed to interpret the policy in the policyholder’s
favor, rendering the ICD unnecessary.
More often, however, such complete elimination of coverage will arise
because an exclusion is broader than an insuring clause. For instance, Purrelli v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.67 involved a liability insurance policy that had an
insuring clause providing coverage for “personal injury” and that explicitly
included “invasion of rights of privacy” in its definition of that term.68 However,
the policy also had an exclusion for personal injuries that were “expected or
intended” by the insured.69 The court found that “invasion of privacy [is] an
intentional tort” and that it “can only be actionable if done intentionally.”70 In
other words, the court found that a specific thing in an insuring clause (invasion
of rights to privacy) belonged to a more general class of things (personal injuries
that are expected or intended) that was subject to an exclusion.
Here, too, the ICD is unnecessary. But what makes it unnecessary is not contra
proferentum; rather, it is another black letter principle of contract interpretation
under which, “[t]o the extent of any conflict, specific provisions control over more
general ones.”71 Pursuant to this principle, the term that addresses how to handle
the specific issue of invasions of privacy should be construed as an exception to
the term that addresses how to handle the more general issue of expected or
intended personal injuries. Thus the policy would be construed to grant coverage
for invasions of privacy notwithstanding the exclusion for expected or intended
injuries before the ICD entered into the analysis.72
Since the ICD seems unnecessary where an exclusion makes coverage under
an insuring clause completely impossible, the real question is whether the ICD
should be applicable to exclusions that diminish coverage to a less-than-absolute
degree. In other words, should there be shadows that are not quite “pitch-black”
but that are nonetheless dark enough to trigger the ICD? A few courts have
discussed this issue in ways that could be taken to suggest that their answer is
66 See Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1380 (Md. 1997) (“If the exclusion totally
swallows the insuring provision, the provisions are completely contradictory. That is the grossest
form of ambiguity . . . .”).
67 698 So. 2d 618, 619-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
68 Id. at 619.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 620.
71 Grynberg v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 296 S.W.3d 132, 137 (Tex. App. 2009); accord DCV
Holdings, Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 961 (Del. 2005) (“Specific language in a contract
controls over general language, and where specific and general provisions conflict, the specific
provision ordinarily qualifies the meaning of the general one.”).
72 Notably, this specific-trumps-general principle of contract interpretation would give the
policyholder more protection than the ICD, because the (specific) coverage would override the (general)
exclusion no matter what. Under the ICD, however, as discussed in the next Section, the coverage would
only override the exclusion insofar as the insurer had a reasonable expectation of coverage.
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no.73 However, none of those courts actually held that the ICD could only be
triggered by exclusions that completely eliminate coverage; rather, they were
saying that such pitch-black shadows are sufficient to trigger the ICD, without
deciding whether they are necessary.74
The prevailing view is that the ICD can be triggered by exclusions that do
not completely eliminate the possibility of the policyholder benefiting from the
coverage in question.75 Courts have varied, however, in how they describe the
degree to which an exclusion must eliminate coverage in order to trigger the
ICD. One common—though, as I will explain, imperfect—formulation of this
non-absolutist standard is that coverage is illusory when there is no “reasonably

73 See, e.g., Bagley v. Monticello Ins. Co., 720 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Mass. 1999) (“[I]f the policy still
provides coverage for some acts, it is not illusory simply because of a potentially wide exclusion.”); Danis
v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 823 N.E.2d 59, 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“An insurance contract is not illusory
where the insured obtains some benefit.”); see also, e.g., Titan Indem. Co. v. Cameron, No. 01-5435, 2002
WL 1774059, at *18 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2002) (quoting Bagley), aff ’d, 77 F. App’x 91 (3d Cir. 2003); Associated
Cmty. Bancorp, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 989 N.Y.S.2d 15, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (same).
74 In Bagley, the court held that an exclusion for illegal acts did not render a general liability
policy illusory, because the policy still covered plenty of liability arising out of legal acts. 720 N.E.2d
at 818. In Danis, the court held that a pollution exclusion in a directors’ and officers’ liability policy
did not create illusory coverage because it left coverage available for pollution-related shareholder
derivative suits, which are not all that unlikely. 823 N.E.2d at 74. In Titan, the court found that
coverage in a law enforcement officer’s liability insurance policy for civil rights violations was not
rendered illusory by an exclusion for expected or intended harm, because there would still be
coverage in the highly plausible scenario in which a civil rights violation was committed without
knowledge or intent (e.g., by using objectively unreasonable force). 2002 WL 1774059, at *19. In
Associated Cmty. Bancorp, the court held that coverage under a “Bankers Professional Liability
Insuring Agreement” was not rendered illusory by an exclusion for claims for “the actual loss of
money, securities, property or other items of value in the custody or control of [the bank]” because
the exclusion left a “broad range of coverage” in place “that may arise in connection with plaintiffs’
provision of ordinary banking services.” 989 N.Y.S.2d at 16. Thus, none of these cases held that even
the slightest possibility of coverage benefiting a policyholder is enough to make it non-illusory.
75 See Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 701 (S.D. Ind.
1996) (“[A]n insurer cannot avoid an illusory coverage problem by simply conceiving of a single
hypothetical situation to which coverage would apply[, because] illusory coverage is a matter of
degree, not absolutes.”); Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1131 (D.C. 2001) (finding
that coverage was not illusory because it was not “non-existent or de minimis”); Martinez v. Idaho
Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho 2000) (holding that coverage is illusory
if “it is extremely minimal and affords no realistic protection to any group or class of injured persons,”
even if “there might be some small circumstance where coverage could arguably exist”); Davidson v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 502, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that coverage is illusory if it
“will not [yield] benefits under any reasonably expected set of circumstances”); Pressman v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757, 759 (R.I. 1990) (holding coverage to be illusory because it would be
precluded “in almost any circumstance” aside from the highly unlikely scenario in which “the insured
had his own generator located inside the building”); Gillund v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 778 N.W.2d
662, 668 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“Coverage is illusory when an insured cannot foresee any
circumstances under which he or she would collect under a particular policy provision.”).
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expected set of circumstances” under which the policyholder would be able to
collect benefits from the policy.76
A revealing illustration of what this “reasonably expected set of
circumstances” standard actually means was provided by Haag v. Castro.77 That
case involved a business auto liability insurance policy that covered liability
for injuries arising out of accidents with rented vehicles, but only while the
rented vehicle was “being used in the business of the Named Insured.”78 The
named insured was the Indiana Youth Soccer Association (“IYSA”).79 After an
IYSA-certified soccer coach got into an accident while driving his team around
in a rented car on a team-building whitewater rafting trip, the insurer denied
coverage on the basis that the vehicle was not being used “in the business” of
the IYSA at the time of the accident.80 The Supreme Court of Indiana agreed
that the vehicle’s use was not in the business of the IYSA, because the IYSA’s
business was limited to “(1) promoting soccer or (2) regulating leagues, teams,
players, and referees or (3) conducting specific events.”81
The court also found that the business use restriction did not render
coverage for rental car accidents illusory.82 It reiterated Indiana’s rule that
“[c]overage under an insurance policy is not illusory unless the policy would not
pay benefits under any reasonably expected set of circumstances.”83 And it
reasoned that there were circumstances in which the coverage would be valuable:
In the course of traveling to promote youth soccer or in transporting a
celebrity guest—perhaps a member of our national team like Lauren Cheney
or Lori Lindsey—to an IYSA sponsored event, an employee or volunteer
might be involved in an auto accident while using a rented vehicle. The
coverage is not illusory.84

76 See Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richie, 540 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. 1989), vacated on reh’g, 544
N.E.2d 488 (Ind. 1989); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Vemma Int’l Holdings Inc., No. 16-01071, 2016
WL 4059606, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 29, 2016) (interpreting Arizona law to hold that coverage is illusory
if it “would result in no payment of benefits under any reasonably expected circumstances”); Great
N. Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2008)
(quoting Meridian as a representation of the rule under Pennsylvania law); Link v. Gen. Cas. Co. of
Wis., 518 N.W.2d 261, 263 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (same for Wisconsin law).
77 959 N.E.2d 819 (Ind. 2012).
78 Id. at 821.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 824-25. Reasonable people can disagree over this, as did a dissenting judge. See id. at
826-27 (Dickson, J., dissenting) (“[A] reasonable construction of the hired auto endorsement
supports coverage . . . .”). However, for these purposes, let us suppose that the majority was correct
that the business use restriction would preclude coverage for the claim at issue if enforced as written.
82 Id. at 824.
83 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
84 Id.
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The Indiana Supreme Court’s ICD analysis in Haag reveals that its
“reasonably expected set of circumstances” formulation does not clearly
express its true standard. The set of circumstances that prevented the ICD
from being triggered—namely, circumstances under which a rental car is
being used in the IYSA’s business—did not need to be expected (let alone
reasonably expected) to arise. Rather, the court found it was sufficient that
such circumstances “might” arise. Thus, it seems as though what the court is
looking for are not circumstances that are reasonably expected, but possible
circumstances that are simply not far-fetched.
Accordingly, the “reasonably expected set of circumstances” formulation
should be jettisoned and replaced with formulations that more straightforwardly
convey that the probability of the coverage ever benefiting the policyholder
needs to be very close to zero.85 One court offered the following helpful
guidance in this vein: “‘[A]n insurer cannot avoid an illusory coverage problem
by simply conceiving of a single hypothetical situation to which coverage would
apply.’ A plaintiff relying on the [ICD] can prevail by showing that the
likelihood of coverage is ‘sufficiently remote to be deemed illusory.’”86
But, setting aside quibbles about how best to articulate the standard, the
prevailing view among American courts that have adopted the ICD is that it can
be triggered by exclusions that do not absolutely eliminate coverage, as long as
they come close. The shadows have to be very dark, but not necessarily pitch-black.
C. Reforming Policies That Have Illusory Coverage
Once a court determines that the ICD has been triggered—which is to say
that the policy contains illusory coverage—the next question is, so what? Should
the illusory coverage–creating exclusion be automatically struck from the policy
85 For good examples of these plausibility-themed formulations, see Colo. Intergovernmental
Risk Sharing Agency v. Northfield Ins. Co., 207 P.3d 839, 843 (Colo. App. 2008) (“Exclusions
impermissibly render coverage illusory when they in effect allow the insurer to receive premiums
when realistically it is not incurring any risk of liability.” (quoting O’Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co.,
696 P.2d 282, 285 (Colo. 1985))); Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1131 (D.C. 2001)
(finding that coverage was not illusory because it was not “non-existent or de minimis”); Martinez
v. Idaho Ctys. Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho 2000) (holding that coverage is
illusory if “it is extremely minimal and affords no realistic protection to any group or class of injured
persons,” even if “there might be some small circumstance where coverage could arguably exist”);
Pressman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757, 759 (R.I. 1990) (holding coverage to be illusory
because it would be precluded “in almost any circumstance” aside from the highly unlikely scenario
in which “the insured had his own generator located inside the building”).
86 Great N. Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 05-635, 2008 WL 2048354, at *5 (W.D. Pa.
May 12, 2008) (quoting Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 701
(S.D. Ind. 1996) and Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richie, 540 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. 1989)); see also
Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Sunset Strip, Inc., No. 1:14-01273, 2015 WL 4545876, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 28,
2015) (“Indiana courts have phrased this inquiry as whether the hypothetical coverage is so
sufficiently remote [as] to be deemed illusory.” (quoting Monticello Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. at 701)).
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entirely? To my knowledge, no court has applied such an approach. Instead,
following Indiana’s lead, courts typically hold that an illusory coverage–creating
exclusion should be reformed only insofar as it contradicts the policyholder’s
reasonable expectations regarding the coverage available under the policy.87 The
clearest articulation of this rule in the case law is as follows:
[An] illusory coverage argument . . . requires a two-part analysis: The Court
must first determine whether the policy is in fact illusory. If the policy is not
illusory, then the unambiguous terms of the policy control . . . . If the policy
is illusory, then the Court must then determine whether [the policyholder]
had a reasonable expectation that claims such as [the] cause of action [for
which the policyholder is seeking coverage] would be covered by the policy.88

A helpful illustration of this rule’s application can be found in the case
described in this Comment’s opening sentence, Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s
Speedway Lounge, Inc.89 There, an insurance company sold a tavern a general
commercial liability insurance policy that contained an “absolute liquor”
exclusion that barred coverage for claims “arising out of or in connection with
the manufacturing, selling, distributing, serving, or furnishing of any
alcoholic beverages.”90 When the tavern was sued for failing to prevent one
of its intoxicated patrons from killing another patron and sought coverage
from its insurer, the insurer tried to deny coverage on the basis of the absolute
liquor exclusion.91 The court found that the exclusion was so broad that it
rendered the tavern’s commercial general liability coverage illusory.92
87 See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 774 F.3d 702, 709 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A] court
must not interpret a policy to allow an insurer to provide largely illusory coverage. In other words,
‘Georgia public policy disfavors insurance provisions that permit the insurer, at the expense of the
insured, to avoid the risk for which the insurer has been paid and for which the insured reasonably
expects it is covered.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Barrett v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
696 S.E.2d 326, 330 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010))); Monticello Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. at 704 (denying an
insurance company’s motion for summary judgment under Indiana law because the coverage that it
sold its insured was illusory, and the insured had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
it had reasonably expected the claim in question to be covered when it bought the policy); Davidson
v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 502, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“Provisions in an insurance policy,
which are unambiguous when read within the policy as a whole, but in effect, provide only illusory
coverage, should be enforced to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); Gillund v.
Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 778 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“Where coverage is illusory,
we have concluded that the contract should be reformed so that it comports with the insured’s
reasonable expectations.”).
88 Nautilus, 2015 WL 4545876, at *6.
89 949 F. Supp. 694.
90 Id. at 696.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 702 (“[W]hile there might be some possibility of claims against a tavern that cannot
be said to have arisen out of . . . the business of selling, distributing, serving, or furnishing alcoholic
beverages, the prospect seems to be ‘sufficiently remote’ as to warrant the conclusion that this
coverage was illusory.”).
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Yet, the finding that the absolute liquor exclusion rendered coverage
illusory was not sufficient to make that exclusion unenforceable against the
claim for which the tavern sought coverage. Rather, the court also had to find,
as a factual matter, that the tavern’s owner had reasonably expected claims
like the one at issue to be covered by the policy at the time he purchased it.93
The court summarized its analysis of this factual issue as follows:
[The tavern] has raised a genuine issue of material fact on the question of its
reasonable expectation of coverage. [Its owner] contracted to buy commercial
general liability coverage for a tavern. His affidavit provides evidence that he
aimed to obtain insurance against the risk that patrons would suffer injury on
the premises. [The owner] explains that he purchased insurance in order to
protect [the tavern] from liability resulting from the business of furnishing
alcoholic beverages to patrons. The policy on its face purports to provide
commercial general liability coverage for a tavern, yet also purports to
exclude from coverage any personal injury and property damage claims
“connected with” the selling, distributing, manufacturing, or furnishing of
alcoholic beverages. The policy language in and of itself is sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact as to [the owner’s] reasonable expectation of
insurance coverage.94

Mike’s Speedway also involves another issue related to how courts should reform
policies once they have been found to contain illusory coverage. We can think of
it as the issue of “multiple sufficient shadows.” Suppose there are two separate
exclusions that each casts its own shadow on the same coverage. And suppose
either of those exclusions would be independently sufficient to deny coverage for
the claim brought by the policyholder. What if one of those shadows is dark
enough to trigger the ICD, while the other shadow is not? Should the
policyholder’s reasonable expectations override the effects of both of those
exclusions, so that the claim is deemed to be covered? Or should the exclusion that
casts the fainter, non-illusory coverage–creating shadow remain enforceable,
regardless of the policyholder’s reasonable expectations, so as to deny the claim?
In Mike’s Speedway, there were two additional exclusions that did not
create illusory coverage and that, if enforced, would have provided a sound
basis for denying the tavern’s claim—an “assault and battery” exclusion and a
“dram shop” exclusion.95 “The issue here,” the court stated, “is whether, as a
matter of law, [the insurer] may rely on these other exclusions to defeat
coverage under a policy that provided only illusory liability coverage from

93
94
95

Id. at 702-04.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 696-97, 703.
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the beginning.”96 It held that “Indiana courts would not permit [the insurer]
to take advantage of these other exclusions” because “Indiana courts treat
illusory insurance coverage as a violation of public policy” and “[f]rom that
perspective, an insurance company that has sold illusory coverage is not likely
to receive a sympathetic audience for its arguments that other exclusions
nevertheless still bar coverage.”97 Thus, the Mike’s Speedway court effectively
held that, if any exclusion casts a shadow over a piece of coverage that alone
is dark enough to trigger the ICD, then all exclusions that cast separate
shadows on that same piece of coverage are unenforceable to the extent that
they conflict with the policyholder’s reasonable expectations.
Other courts disagree. For example, in DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty
Insurance Co., the court held that a “Satellite Exclusion” in DISH Network’s
liability insurance policy was unenforceable because the court could “envision
no scenario in which the exclusion would not apply.”98 However, the court
nonetheless allowed the insurer to rely on “another, legally sound exclusion” as
a basis upon which to deny coverage for DISH Network’s claim.99 Likewise, in
Gillund v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Co., the court held that, even if an
insurance policy’s limitation of coverage to “accidents” rendered its purported
coverage for invasions of privacy illusory, the insurer could still rely on a valid
exclusion for violations of penal laws to deny coverage to a policyholder whose
invasion of privacy amounted to such a violation.100
I agree with the approach taken in DISH Network and Gillund, under which
the fact that one exclusion’s enforcement would render certain coverage illusory
has no effect on the enforceability of other non-illusory coverage–creating
exclusions with respect to that same coverage. The contrary approach taken in
Mike’s Speedway could create unfair windfalls for policyholders and put insurers
in excessive danger of being forced to cover more risk than they intended to
underwrite. That approach would also unduly complicate coverage disputes,
since it would give policyholders a reason to challenge various arguably illusory
coverage–creating exclusions in their policies that otherwise would have been
totally irrelevant to a dispute.
96
97
98

Id. at 703.
Id.
989 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1153-54 (D. Colo. 2013), aff ’d sub nom. Dish Network Corp. v. Arrowood
Indem. Co., 772 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 2014). The Satellite Exclusion stated that “This insurance does
not apply to Bodily Injury, Property Damage, Personal Injury or Advertising Injury arising out of
the ownership, operation or use of any satellite.” Id. at 1153. Since DISH Network is “in the
subscription satellite television business,” the exclusion, if enforced, would apply to virtually all of
DISH Network’s claims. Id. at 1153-54.
99 Id. at 1154. The “legally sound” exclusion was a “Business Exclusion” that barred coverage
for “‘[a]dvertising injury’ arising out of . . . an offense committed by an insured whose business is
advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting.” Id. at 1146-47.
100 778 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
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The Mike’s Speedway approach appears to be motivated by a desire to deter
insurers from issuing policies with exclusions that trigger the ICD. But
sufficient deterrence would be created by overriding those “bad” exclusions
with the policyholder’s reasonable expectations, even if all the other
exclusions remained fully enforceable. For these reasons, the only exclusions
that should be overridden by policyholders’ reasonable expectations pursuant
to the ICD should be those that actually trigger the ICD.101
III. HOW THE DOCTRINE COMPARES TO ITS ALTERNATIVES
Given the background principle that insurance policies should generally be
construed as they are written,102 any doctrine whose purpose is to require
insurers to provide coverage that is excluded by the unambiguous language of
their policies could seem adverse to the interests of the insurance industry.
Thus, it is worth noting that the ICD is friendlier to the insurance industry
than the alternative doctrines that could be implicated by the same fact
patterns, namely conta preferentum and the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
A. The ICD and Contra Proferentum
If a court looks at an exclusion that casts a dark shadow over coverage and
sees ambiguity, the court will apply contra proferentum and resolve the
ambiguity in the policyholder’s favor, even if the policyholder had no
reasonable expectation of coverage. If, on the other hand, the court looks at
the same policy and instead sees illusory coverage, the court will only grant
coverage if the policyholder can show that he or she reasonably expected the
coverage to be available.
101 Notice the difference between (1) the situations discussed here, in which there is one
illusory coverage–creating exclusion and one non-illusory coverage–creating exclusion, and each is
independently sufficient to deny the policyholder’s claim, and (2) situations in which illusory
coverage is created by the cumulative effects of multiple exclusions. An example of the former would
be a policy with both an exclusion for “A” and an exclusion for “A-Z,” while an example of the latter
would be a policy with twenty-six exclusions, one for each letter of the alphabet. If a policyholder
brings a claim for “A,” and reasonably expects “A” to be covered, his coverage should be denied if he
has the former policy, because the illusory coverage–creating “A-Z” exclusion should not invalidate
the “A” exclusion that is independently sufficient to deny the claim. But coverage for “A” should be
granted if he has the latter policy, because the cumulative effect of the “A” exclusion combined with
the twenty-five other exclusions effectively creates an “A-Z” exclusion that triggers the ICD.
102 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017) (stating that there is a “presumption in favor of plain meaning” in insurance policy
interpretation); see also 16 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 49:14 (4th ed. 1993) (stating that the terms of insurance policies, like those in
other kinds of contracts, should be “accorded their plain and ordinary, popular or commonly
accepted meaning, unless it appears from the policy itself or by usage that the parties intended to
use the words in a special or technical sense” (footnotes omitted)).
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This difference can be neatly illustrated by comparing Kiger and Mike’s
Speedway. In Kiger, a gas station’s “garage policy” had a pollution exclusion that
“excluded the major source of potential liability.”103 The same could be said of the
absolute liquor exclusion in the policy sold to the tavern in Mike’s Speedway.104
Yet, the court in Kiger saw ambiguity and held that the “rule of construing
exclusions strictly against the insurer and in favor of coverage . . . requires that
coverage for the gasoline contamination which occurred be available.”105 In
contrast, the court in Mike’s Speedway saw illusory coverage and held that the
policyholder could only receive the coverage he sought upon establishing that he
reasonably expected such coverage at the time the policy was issued.106
Thus, conceiving of illusory coverage as a special issue governed by its own
doctrine, and not as a form of ambiguity, would be an insurer-friendly move.
B. The ICD and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
The ICD is also far friendlier to insurers than the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. The crux of the doctrine of reasonable expectations is that “[t]he
objectively reasonable expectations of [policyholders] regarding the terms of
insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations.”107 This is obviously a more
expansive, pro-policyholder doctrine than the ICD, which requires that coverage
be rendered illusory and that it be reasonably expected by the policyholder.
The reasonable expectations doctrine’s leading case is C & J Fertilizer, Inc.
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. There, the policy at issue offered coverage for
“burglary” but contained what the court described as an “exclusion . . .
masking as a definition.”108 Buried in “fine print,” the exclusion removed
coverage for burglaries from which there were no “visible marks made by
tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the
exterior of the premises at the place of such entry.”109 The policyholder
brought a claim for a burglary that left such visible marks on a door in the
interior of the premises, but not the exterior, which was where the policy’s
fine print required the marks to be.110 The Iowa Supreme Court held that,
notwithstanding the exclusion “bur[ied]” in the written policy, the
103
104
105
106
107

Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E. 2d 945, 948 (Ind. 1996).
Monticello Ins. Co. v. Mike’s Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694, 702 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
662 N.E.2d at 949.
949 F. Supp. at 704.
Keeton, supra note 40, at 967. For a review of the doctrine of illusory expectations, see
generally Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two
Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990).
108 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975).
109 Id. at 171.
110 Id.
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policyholder had a reasonable expectation that burglaries such as the one that
occurred would be covered under the policy.111 On that basis, the court held
that “the doctrine [of reasonable expectations] demands” that the burglary be
deemed covered by the policy.112
Analyzing the same facts under the ICD, however, would have led to
victory for the insurer. Clearly, the possibility of a burglary leaving the visible
marks of force and violence on a premises’ exterior, as required for coverage
under the policy, is not so remote as to render the coverage illusory. Thus, the
ICD would not have been triggered by the policy, and the analysis would
never have reached the reasonable expectations prong, so coverage would have
been validly denied.
The ICD can therefore be viewed as a narrowing of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. It restricts the circumstances under which a policyholder’s
reasonable expectations should override a policy’s clear terms to those in which
the insurer seeks to rely on exclusions that not only eliminate coverage for the
specific claim being brought by the policyholder, but that also render certain
coverage illusory. In other words, the ICD puts an illusory-coverage “filter” on
the doctrine of reasonable expectations.113
This filter ameliorates the doctrine of reasonable expectations’ main
drawback, which is that it leaves insurers so uncertain about what risks they
will actually be required to bear under their policies that they have trouble
pricing them efficiently. Replacing the doctrine of reasonable expectations
with the ICD would dramatically reduce insurers’ uncertainty, because it is
much easier for insurers to predict whether their policies will be held to
contain illusory coverage than whether their policies will be held to violate a
policyholder’s reasonable expectations.
While there is obviously some vagueness in the standard for illusory
coverage—how dark of a shadow is too dark?—there is far more vagueness in
the doctrine of reasonable expectations. For one thing, a court’s judgment as to
the reasonableness of a policyholder’s expectations turns on the amount of
effort the court determines the policyholder should have made to read and
understand the policy—a difficult determination for parties to predict in
advance. The illusory-coverage “filter” would give insurers a “safe harbor”: if
insurers want to avoid the risk that a court will find it reasonable for a
111
112
113

Id. at 177.
Id.
This way of looking at the ICD fits nicely with the Nautilus court’s “two-part analysis” for
the ICD—the first part looking at whether the coverage sought by the policyholder is illusory, and
only the second part looking at whether the policyholder had a reasonable expectation of such
coverage being available under the policy. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Sunset Strip, Inc., No. 1:14-01273, 2015
WL 4545876, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2015).
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policyholder to expect coverage notwithstanding unambiguous exclusions, they
can do so by making sure those exclusions do not render the coverage illusory.
Or, going the other way, if insurers are nervous that an exclusion might trigger
the ICD, they can protect themselves by taking care to clearly explain the effect
of that exclusion to their applicants, so that their policyholders could never hold
reasonable expectations that conflict with the exclusion.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to explain what the ICD is, how it works
(and should work), and how it compares to related doctrines pertaining to
insurance contracts’ interpretation and enforceability. In summary, the ICD
is a doctrine of insurance contract enforceability, as opposed to interpretation,
that serves to protect policyholders from procedurally unconscionable
exclusions that almost completely wipe out the coverage purportedly available
under their policies. If any coverage purportedly offered by the policy—no
matter how “small” that coverage is in comparison with the remainder of the
policy—is so restricted by an exclusion that the policyholder’s chance of
actually benefiting from that coverage drops to almost zero, the coverage is
rendered illusory, and the ICD is triggered. The exclusions that trigger the
ICD—and only those exclusions—should be reformed to the extent that they
conflict with the policyholder’s reasonable expectations. Thus, if a
policyholder had a reasonable expectation for coverage that was rendered
illusory by an exclusion, the policy should be enforced, contrary to that
exclusion’s unambiguous meaning, so as provide that coverage.
The ICD is certainly a pro-policyholder exception to the general principle
that insurance contracts should be construed as they are written. But compared
to the other doctrines that could be invoked in similar circumstances, the ICD
provides policyholders with narrower protection and insurers with greater
certainty of what risks they will ultimately be required to bear. The ICD
requires policies to be enforced contrary to the meaning of their terms only
when they are procedurally unconscionable—which insurers should be able to
foresee when they draft the policies—and only to the extent that they deprive
policyholders of coverage they reasonably expected. In this way, the ICD
strikes a satisfying balance between the interests of policyholders and insurers.

